Maric v Nguyen WADC 2 [2020] was a Motor Vehicle Accident injury case that was heard on appeal by Lonsdale DCJ in the District Court of Western Australia. The principle issue for consideration in this matter was the quantification of the Plaintiff’s damages as liability had already been accepted by the Insurance Commission of Western Australia (ICWA). This involved an assessment of the Plaintiff’s injuries and the consequences of those injuries in the past, and what consequences may arise in the future. On 4 February 2015 the Plaintiff, who was right-handed, was injured in an accident whilst riding her motorcycle. The Plaintiff suffered multiple injuries as a result of the accident, but most significant of all was a comminuted fracture to her right wrist, which left her with a permanent disability. This was particularly important as the Plaintiff was employed as a hairdresser before the accident and could no longer work in her field. As a result, the Plaintiff had not worked for four years by the time her matter was heard on trial. The trial judge quantified her past loss of earnings at $351,278. The Plaintiff also submitted that she would be unable to find employment in the future as she had trained and worked as a hairdresser her whole life. The judge, however, held that the Plaintiff was an intelligent and capable woman who would be able to retrain and re-enter the work force after studying for four years. The judge therefore awarded the Plaintiff four years of future loss of earning capacity, amounting to $349,570. Prior to the accident, the Plaintiff was an extremely active person who enjoyed sports such as ‘Krav Maga,’ basketball, ping pong, tennis, and outdoor activities such as hiking and skiing, rock climbing, wind surfing and kite surfing. The Plaintiff also described riding her motorcycle as a passion but was no longer able to do any of these activities due to her injuries. The Plaintiff’s social life was also affected by the accident as she become more withdrawn and unwilling to go out. The Plaintiff lives in constant pain and described herself as feeling depressed. The judge found that due to the accident the Plaintiff had suffered considerable loss of amenities and diminution in her ability to partake in activities that she had previously enjoyed or might in the future have enjoyed. She was no longer able to be active, her social life had become non-existent and she would never be able to return to work as a hairdresser, which she loved. The judge accordingly awarded $106,250 (25% of the maximum amount) in general damages. The Plaintiff also received compensation for gratuitous services, special damages, future medical expenses and future education expenses. In total, the Plaintiff’s final award amounted to $1,037,800. The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances. The post Devastating wrist injury to international hairdresser – a hairy experience! appeared first on A & E Legal. via A & E Legal https://www.aelegal.com.au/blog/devastating-wrist-injury-to-international-hairdresser-a-hairy-experience/
0 Comments
PEET [2020] WACIC 9 In the matter of Shane Geoffrey Peet, on 1 July 2020, the Chief Assessor for Criminal Injuries Compensation, awarded the applicant the sum of $300 compensation for an injury suffered during an arrest in his capacity as a Police Officer, on Thursday 26 January 2017 (incident). The application was made pursuant to section 12 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003. The Applicant had been assaulted by the Offender while processing the Offender after an arrest. The Offender pled guilty to two counts of assault on a public officer (one relating to the applicant and another relating to the other officer who was assisting in the restraint of the Offender) as well as obstructing public officers with disorderly behaviour in a police station or lock-up. The incident occurred at Cockburn Police Station. The Offender had come out of the holding cell following the initial computer capturing process and was asked to sign the forms, he refused to do so, attempted to leave the custody area and was apprehended by the Applicant and another officer. A struggle ensued and after this the Applicant realised he was in discomfort and pain. He said his left knee was sore from falling to the ground with the Offender and his upper back, neck, and arms and across his shoulders were sore from struggling with him whilst he resisted. He noticed reddening and early stages of bruising on the inside of both biceps from the struggle. The Applicant attended St John of God Hospital Emergency Department and was subsequently discharged with a recommendation to carry out light duties only. The evidence obtained by the Assessor was as follows:
The Applicant had submitted very little evidence to support his claim. The medical records had mostly been obtained by the Assessor at her own initiative and showed very little support for a serious injury. The case demonstrates the importance of ensuring that proper records are kept of the consequences of any criminal injury and that these records be submitted with the claim at time of submission. It is instructive to note that the time from the commission of the offence until the time that the compensation was awarded was almost 3 ½ years. The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances. The post Injured Policeman Receives $300 Compensation appeared first on A & E Legal. via A & E Legal https://www.aelegal.com.au/blog/injured-policeman-receives-300-compensation/ In the matter of Moala [2020] WACIC 1, the Claimant, a Police Officer was injured whilst executing an arrest warrant for the arrest of two offenders. The Claimant and his Police Officer partner attended to search an address, in an industrial area, after having been informed that the offenders were there. On arrival they noticed another Police Officer running to the back of the particular compound and in an attempt to assist, the Claimant and his Police Officer partner scaled the fence. When the Claimant had reached the top of fence, he sat there with his legs on the inside of the premises and jumped down and landed awkwardly. Placing all his weight on his right ankle he felt excruciating pain and was unable to weight bear being subsequently diagnosed with a fractured tibia and was treated accordingly. The offenders were not found at the premises. The Claimant made an application with the Office for Criminal Injuries Compensation for compensation for the injuries suffered “as a consequence of” the incident when he scaled the fence and fracture his tibia. To award the Claimant compensation, an assessor for criminal injuries compensation must be satisfied that the injury occurred ‘as a consequence‘ of the commission of an offence or alleged offence. There are a number of court cases which have examined the meaning of the term ‘as a consequence of’ or variations thereof. The Australian courts have stated that the common law principles of remoteness and foreseeability were not applicable. This approach was followed by the Western Australian courts where it was said that consideration of the phrase ‘as a consequence of’ is not to determine “whether the injury was remote or proximate” but whether it was as a consequence of the commission of the offence or the alleged offence. Foreseeability and remoteness are irrelevant to that determination. The phrase “as a consequence of” therefore requires a consideration of whether the injuries suffered by a person are “causally connected” to the offence to entitle a person to compensation. The assessor was not convinced that the common-law common-sense test of negligence is appropriate in determining whether an injury occurred ‘as a consequence’ of an offence. This is particularly so when it has been established the common law principles of remoteness, proximity and foreseeability are irrelevant. Therefore, in her view, the assessor stated that the matter was simple: as a question of fact, did the Claimant suffer an injury as a consequence of the offence? This should not be clouded by principles of common law negligence or the substitution of other expressions to reach the determination. The question to be determined by the assessor was whether the Claimant’s injury to his ankle occurred as a consequence of those offences/alleged offences committed by the offenders OR as a result of attempting to execute Arrest Warrants issued for the offenders. The Assessor was satisfied that:
Therefore, the assessor was not satisfied that the Claimant suffered injury as a consequence of the offences for which the offenders were convicted and there were no other alleged offences which caused the Claimant’s injury and refused his application. Disclaimer: The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances. The post No Damages to Police Officer after Chase – Who is Sitting on the Fence? appeared first on A & E Legal. via A & E Legal https://www.aelegal.com.au/blog/no-damages-to-police-officer-after-chase-who-is-sitting-on-the-fence/ CLEARY -v- THE INSURANCE COMMISSION OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2019] The plaintiff sought damages for personal injuries suffered on 27 April 2012, when a motor vehicle struck his bicycle from behind whilst he was stationary at traffic lights. The plaintiff commenced proceedings against the Insurance Commission of Western Australia (ICWA), the statutory body tasked to manage motor vehicle accident claims in WA, for the injuries sustained, namely:
ICWA admitted that the plaintiff suffered the injuries mentioned above as a result of the driver’s negligence and the only issue for determination by the Court was the assessment of his damages, namely the extent of the plaintiff injuries suffered as a result of the driver’s negligence and the assessment of his lost earning capacity, both past and future. In his particulars of damage, the plaintiff alleged that as a result of his injuries he lost significant consulting work and was unable to attend to the daily management of his business, resulting in its closure based largely on the claimed cognitive effects of his brain injury. After multiple specialists gave evidence in regards to the plaintiffs long-term injuries the Court found that “…the effect of the head injury on the plaintiff’s cognitive abilities,…the work the plaintiff was doing became more difficult for him after the accident, it cost him more in effort to do that work, and that he derived less enjoyment from it. However, I also find that he was able to effectively overcome these difficulties for a significant period after the accident, managing not only to sustain his pre-accident income but to substantially increase it in 2014 and 2015. The Court concluded that “…the plaintiff’s ability to compete in that business had been reduced by his depression and loss of confidence and drive as a result of the cognitive effects of the brain injury. In addition, I find the effects of his cognitive impairment and depression have diminished the plaintiff competitiveness in the job market generally to some extent” The Court awarded the plaintiff $229,076 for past and future loss of earning capacity, $146,300 for pain and suffering being 35% of a most extreme case and medical costs amounting to a total of $437,328. The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances. The post Cyclist suffers brain injury after driver negligence appeared first on A & E Legal. via A & E Legal https://www.aelegal.com.au/blog/cyclist-suffers-brain-injury-after-driver-negligence/ NUROVIC -v- NUROVIC [2019] WADC 28 On 1 April 2014 the appellant pleaded guilty to unlawfully assaulting the respondent on 27 December 2013 and thereby doing her bodily harm in circumstances of aggravation. The respondent subsequently lodged a claim for criminal compensation pursuant to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2013 (WA) (the Act) and on 10 October 2018 was awarded $47,821.95 by the assessor. The appellant appealed that decision on the grounds that:
In regard to the claim that the appellant received incompetent legal advice the court stated that “…if the appellant wished to dispute that he assaulted the respondent he should have pleaded not guilty and the matter would have gone to trial. In the four years since the plea he has not sought to appeal his guilty plea. He cannot now controvert his plea or the material facts that were read to the court upon sentencing” In regard to the claim the appellant did not break the respondent’s nose the court stated that “…no challenge was made to that fact that the assault had caused the broken nose. The appellant cannot come to this court and say that his blow did not break her nose. If he wished to challenge the assertion which was clearly made at the court on both 1 April 2014 and 14 October 2014, he should have raised the issue then and there and it would have been dealt with by the magistrate. It cannot now be raised” In relation to any pre-existing medical condition suffered by the respondent before the broken nose the court found “…there is absolutely no evidence that she had a pre-existing condition that would have meant her nose would have been broken in any event. Whilst any pre-existing nasal difficulty may have left her predisposed to a broken nose, the appellant simply takes his victim as he finds her”. The respondent claimed additional loss of past and future earning capacity (the Court been allowed to received new and further evidence) and the Court stated that “…ultimately the respondent claim for past loss of earnings is really based on the fact that she had significantly more time off after the incident than she did prior to the incident and therefore she says she should be award compensation to reflect her loss of income”. However, the Court was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent had made a case for loss of future earning capacity. Whilst it accepted that the respondent was fearful of losing her job because of the time she took off work and that the evidence established that she becomes withdrawn, the evidence also shows she was then working full-time and would be able to for the foreseeable future. The court proceeded to increase the award and assessed it at $50,384.29 for injuries and losses in respect of the proved offence” The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances. The post Criminal injuries compensation awarded on appeal appeared first on A & E Legal. via A & E Legal https://www.aelegal.com.au/blog/criminal-injuries-compensation-awarded-on-appeal/ ESPINOS -v- JANE ELIZABETH POPOVIC as Executor and Holder of a Grant of Probate of the Estate of the Late EMIL POPOVIC [2018] WADC 94 The plaintiff, Barry John Espinos (Mr Espinos), first saw the late Dr Popovic, a neurosurgeon, in October 2010. At that point, Mr Espinos was aged 55, and was engaged in running a sand supply business. On 10 November 2010, the late Dr Popovic performed surgery on Mr Espinos to rectify the back and spinal issues he was suffering from. On 17 December 2010, surgery on Mr Espinos’ spine was commenced, however, due to an infection the surgery did not continue and had to be aborted. Mr Espinos was treated for the infection until late January 2011. After further surgery from the late Dr Popovic in February 2011, Mr Espinos continued to suffer further symptoms, including severe neurological pain down his right leg. On 4 February 2011, a CT scan was performed. This scan revealed the misplacement of two of the screws used in the surgery. In total, Mr Espinos had undergone eight spinal operations by that time. The consequences of all of this for Mr Espinos have been disastrous. A short time after this, the late Dr Popovic died, and his widow become the executor and was substituted as defendant in proceedings commenced by Mr Espinos seeking damages for negligence and breach of contract. The Court found that “…there was a clearly foreseeable and not insignificant risk of injury in the form of complications in Mr Espinos’ spine. Firstly, in failing to treat the L5/S1 problem at the first surgery and performing surgery at the ‘wrong’ level in the same surgery. Secondly, the insertion of a screw into the nerve canal where the S1 nerve root lies also carries a foreseeable risk of significant injury or detriment to health. In the insertion of screws into any part of the spine, any reasonable specialist neurosurgeon must be required to take precautions against the risks involved in performing that surgery…” The Court concluded “…that Dr Popovic was negligent at surgery on 2 February 2011, and subsequently in failing to identify the misplacement of the pedicle screw and that the pain was caused by the screw. Dr Popovic’s fourth surgery, on 11 February 2011, was to address and explore Mr Espinos’ symptoms after 2 February which were directly caused by his negligence on 2 February 2011…” The Court was satisfied to the required standard that Mr Espinos’ ongoing pain and spinal symptoms were due substantially to the breaches of duty by Dr Popovic, and that his ongoing further treatment in relation to his spine and pain are as a result of that damage. The Court proceeded to find “…judgment for Mr Espinos in the sum of $4,817,311 and… costs”. The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances. The post Eight Surgeries and Still in Pain appeared first on A & E Legal. via A & E Legal https://www.aelegal.com.au/blog/eight-surgeries-still-pain/ (CHIN -v- DAYMASTER PTY LTD [2018] WADC 80) On Tuesday, 28 December 2010, shortly after closing time at the Home Hardware & Plumbing store (store), the plaintiff (Ms Chin), was assaulted in an attempted armed robbery of by three men, including the second defendant (Mr Hall). The store was owned and operated by the first defendant, Daymaster Pty Ltd (Daymaster). At the material time, Mr Hall was employed at the store by Daymaster. Following the attempted robbery, Mr Hall and two others pleaded guilty to an offence of aggravated assault upon Ms Chin with intent to commit a robbery. Ms Chin sought to recover damages from Daymaster in respect of her injury, loss and damage sustained as a result of the assault upon her person. Daymaster accepted that, as the occupier of the store, it had a duty of care towards Ms Chin, as a customer, to see that she would not suffer injury or damage (duty of care). The Court was required to establish the scope of Daymaster’s duty of care by answering whether:
The thrust of Ms Chin’s claim was that Daymaster, through its staff, did not comply with the store closing procedure by allowing Ms Chin into the store after hours when the rear sliding door had not been locked. Ms Chin’s case is that the store’s staff failed to lock this door, thereby allowing Mr Hall, the other two offenders and Ms Chin access into the building being causative of the assault. In cases of this nature, the law states that where the nature of the harm suffered by a visitor to a premises (store) was physical injury inflicted by a third party over whose actions the occupier had no control, the relevant duty must be a duty related to the security of the visitor. It must have been a duty to take reasonable care to protect the victim from conduct, including criminal conduct, of the third party. In such circumstances, it is exceptional to find in law a duty to control the actions, including criminal conduct, of another person to prevent harm to strangers, unless the case is one of a special relationship involving a duty to control that other person’s actions. It is trite that criminal behaviour is unpredictable and that is one reason why, as a general rule, and in the absence of some special relationship, the law does not impose a duty to prevent harm to another from the criminal conduct of a third party, even if the risk of such harm is foreseeable. Regarding vicarious liability, the law states that for an employer to be vicariously liable for the wrongful act of its employee, that act must have been committed in the course or scope of employment. The difficulty is often in determining that course or scope of employment. This can be tested by asking whether the act was authorised by the employer or was an unauthorised mode of doing some act authorised by the employer or even an unauthorised act, provided the act was so connected with authorised acts that it may be regarded as a mode, although an improper mode, of doing it. The Court concluded that:
Ms Chin’s claim dismissed. The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances. The post Hardware store not liable for injuries sustained by patron during robbery appeared first on A & E Legal. via A & E Legal https://www.aelegal.com.au/blog/hardware-store-not-liable-for-injuries-sustained-by-patron-during-robbery/ (BRIGGS -v- WACHS – PILBARA (HEDLAND HEALTH CAMPUS) [2018] WADC 73) The Hedland Health Campus employed Mr David Briggs (Mr Briggs) as a Registered Nurse. In March 2016, Mr Briggs was assaulted at work as a result of which he suffered an injury to his left shoulder. The employer accepted liability. In February 2017 Mr Briggs drove from South Hedland to Perth and back to see an approved medical specialist, Dr Cordova. The question which arose for determination was whether the employer was obliged to pay Mr Briggs’ vehicle running expenses, together with meals and accommodation in the sum of $1,996.08. In order to answer that question, it was necessary for the Court to determine which clause of schedule 1 to the Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) (Act) applied. An approved medical specialist such as Dr Cordova may be required to make an assessment of a worker, the approved specialist is required to give to the worker and the employer a written report of the worker’s degree of impairment, including details of the assessment and reasons justifying the assessment and a certificate specifying the worker’s degree of impairment. Clause 17(1aa) of Schedule 1 to the Act provides that a worker can claim for certain specified expenses for his/her first assessment or attempt at an assessment for the purposes of s 93L of the Act (which this was) but not including the cost of any travel, meals, or lodging. Clause 19(3A) of Schedule 1 to the Act provides that where a worker travels for his/her degree of impairment to be assessed by an approved medical specialist the employer is liable to pay the worker’s vehicle running expenses, reasonable fares and expenses and reasonable cost of meals and lodging. Considering the two clauses above, the Court applied the principle that statutory texts enacted by the same legislature are to be construed so far as possible to operate in harmony and not in conflict. That principle of harmonious construction applies to the construct ion of provisions within different statutes of the same legislature to create a very strong presumption that the legislature did not intend to contradict itself but intended that both should operate. Clause 17(1aa) is confined by its express words to expenses arising from a s 93L assessment. Clause 19(3A) deals with any case where a worker travels for his/her degree of impairment to be assessed by an approved medical specialist or panel. Clause 19(3A) includes but is not limited to s 93L assessment. Clause 19(3A) is therefore wider in its potential application than cl 17(1aa). There is a principle of statutory interpretation that where there is a conflict between two sections of an act and where there is a general provision which, if applied in its entirety, would neutralise a special provision dealing with the same subject matter, the special provision must be read as a proviso to the general provision, and the general provision in so far as it is inconsistent with the special provision, must be deemed not to apply. Applying that principle, the Court was satisfied that the arbitrator was correct in concluding that the two provisions can in fact be read together. Although cl 19(3A) expressly contemplates the payment of a worker’s travelling expenses where a worker travels in order to have their degree of impairment assessed by an approved medical specialist, there are a number of reasons for such an assessment. Clause 19(3A) provides for travel, meal and lodging expenses for all attendances for the purposes of common law assessments (s93L). In the latter scenario the position is governed by cl 17(1aa). The Court was not prepared to disregard the plain words of the clauses, as there is a longstanding principle of statutory interpretation that all words in legislation should (where possible) be given meaning and effect therefore, those exclusionary words do not apply only to expenses payable under cl 17 and declined to construe the Act so as to conclude that a worker is compensated for medical and other expenses under cl 17(1) whilst, notwithstanding cl17(1aa), paid the associated travel and other expenses under cl 19. Therefore, the employer was not obliged to pay Mr Briggs’ vehicle running expenses, together with meals and accommodation in the sum of $1,996.08. The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances. The post Worker not entitled to vehicle running expenses and accommodation appeared first on A & E Legal. via A & E Legal https://www.aelegal.com.au/blog/worker-not-entitled-to-vehicle-running-expenses-and-accommodation/ (CME [2018] WADC 69) On 4 April 2017 the appellant, CME, applied pursuant to s 17 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003 (WA) (the Act) for criminal injuries compensation in respect of injuries she sustained in an alleged assault occurring on 4 July 2015. CME alleges that she was walking across an oval in Albany carrying a pie and a bag of chips when she was approached by two females asking for money. After a brief discussion the assailants knocked the pie out of her hand, punched her in the stomach, grabbed her ponytail, pulled her head up and then punched her on the left side of the face. As a result of this incident she suffered pain and injury. The matter was not reported to the police until 27 April 2016 (almost one year later). No person was charged as a result of the incident. On 28 June 2017 the assessor for criminal injuries compensation provisionally determined the application and finally determined on 31 July 2017 to refuse the application on the basis that the delay in reporting the matter to the police was not reasonable. CME appealed from that decision. The appeal was lodged within time. Was CME the victim of a criminal offence? After deliberation the Court stated that it was “… satisfied on the balance of probabilities that CME suffered bodily harm…defined by law to be a bodily injury of such a nature as to interfere with health or comfort…. [and was] satisfied that the injury she sustained, essentially a fracture of the orbital floor, interfered with her health or comfort”. CME has had other numerous claims for criminal injuries compensation and has only claimed where she was able to identify the offender, unlike this case. The Court stated that “…Her subjective belief that if she could not identify the offender there was effectively nothing to tell the police and therefore no point in making a report is a belief I find that she genuinely held”. Medical evidence The medical evidence established that CME suffered a left orbital floor fracture which caused numbness to the left side of her face. Economic loss A clinical psychologist who saw CME reported that CME’s “current psychological, emotional, cognitive and behavioural symptoms are likely to impede concentration and reduce her general performance” and indicated that in the short-term CME had reduced capacity to work but in the long-term her capacity would depend on her response to treatment. No award was made for this head of damage. The court, after taken the above on board allowed the appeal and awarded CME the following:
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances. The post Late application for Criminal Injuries Compensation allowed by Appeal Court appeared first on A & E Legal. via A & E Legal https://www.aelegal.com.au/blog/late-application-for-criminal-injuries-compensation-allowed-by-appeal-court/ ROBERTSON V HOPWOOD [2018] WADC 66 It is uncontentious that on the day of the incident, the respondent (Mr Hopwood) was at the Inglewood Hotel watching a rugby match from about 6.00 pm and that the appellant (Mr Robertson) was also there. It is also uncontentious that the Mr Hopwood had known the offender for approximately 10 years, as a work colleague and once a friend, but that the two had fallen out before the incident over some work contracts. Their work environment was quite toxic. The CCTV footage of the incident shows the Mr Hopwood and his friend on their way out of the hotel. Mr Hopwood’s attention was drawn by a call from a woman, Sarah, who he knew and who was Mr Robertson’s sister. Mr Hopwood stopped to talk to Sarah. He spoke to her for less than a minute. There is nothing in the CCTV footage to suggest that the conversation was anything other than amicable and short. As Mr Hopwood then turned to leave, he saw Mr Robertson and some brief words were exchanged. Mr Hopwood and a friend then exchanged some words and Mr Robertson’s friend grabbed Mr Hopwood by the arm. Mr Hopwood’s written statement states that he remembers exchanging words with Mr Robertson and his friends but did not remember what those words were. His next recollection was being in an ambulance and later at Sir Charles Gairdner Hospital. Mr Hopwood in this matter had brought a cross-appeal applying for the Criminal Injuries Compensation assessor’s decision to be increased on the basis that the allowance “for general damages; past and future loss of income as well as past and future treatment expenses were too low”. Mr Hopwood sought to be paid the maximum award of compensation of $75,000. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Assessor, by a compensation award dated 6 November 2015, awarded Mr Hopwood the sum of $49,041.11 compensation (the award) for the injuries and losses that the assessor was satisfied he had suffered as a consequence of the incident. The Criminal Injuries Compensation assessor was satisfied that Mr Hopwood had been injured in the commission of a proven offence and the application was there for properly brought pursuant to s 12 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act. In the course of her decision, the Criminal Injuries Compensation assessor also considered whether any award should be reduced because, at one stage during the incident, Mr Hopwood had head-butted Mr Robinson. There are specific heads of loss defined in s 6 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act to include:
On reflection the judge stated “Accordingly, I am prepared to award the respondent (Mr Hopwood) compensation in the sum of $75,000 being the statutory maximum and which is made up of the sum of $40,000 in general damages and so much of the losses under 6(2)(a) to take it up to the statutory maximum”. The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances. The post Victim of a violent assault prevails with further compensation on appeal. appeared first on A & E Legal. via A & E Legal https://www.aelegal.com.au/blog/victim-of-a-violent-assault-prevails-with-further-compensation-on-appeal/ |